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BASTARD IN THE GAS FIELD: ACCOUNTING
TO THE UNRECOGNIZED OWNER
SI M. BONDUAN*
King John: My mother's son did get your father's heir; your
father's heir must have your father's land.
Robert: Shall then my father's will be of no force to dispossess
that child which is not his?
Bastard: Of no more force to dispossess me, sir, than was his
will to get me, as I think.**
L Introduction
One of the most fertile frontiers of oil and gas jurisprudence is the
emerging field of reconciliation of rights among the owners of common
accumulations of natural gas. This area is generally lumped under the rubric
of "gas balancing" disputes. While there is a dearth of reported gas
balancing cases,' a growing body of literature is developing to assist the
practitioner in coping with the problems that are finding their way to the
courthouse steps.2 This article will address one small corner of this frontier
o 1990 Gerald & Brand
* Partner, Gerald & Brand, Jackson, Mississippi. J.D., 1975, University of Mississippi;
B.S., 1971, Mississippi State University.
** W. SaA1csPE.4AR, THE LwE AND D.AT OF KiNo JOHN, act 1, scene 1, 11. 128-33.
1. One of the problems faced in researching this area of law is the paucity of reported
cases. The only readily accessible significant decisions are: Pelto Oil Co. v. CSX Oil & Gas
Corp., 804 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1991); Pogo Producing Co. v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 898
F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1990); Kaiser-Frances v. Producer's Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1989);
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 755 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
847 (1985); Killgore v. Texaco, Inc., No. 83-4826 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 1987) (1987 WESTLAW
6203); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 516 So. 2d 376 (La. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 520
So. 2d 118 (La. 1988), on appeal after remand, 566 So. 2d 138 (La. Ct. App. 1990); HBOP,
Ltd. v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 645 P.2d 1042 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982); United Petroleum
Exploration Co., Inc. v. Premiere Resources, Ltd., 511 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Beren
v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
2. Martin, The Gas Balancing Agreement: What, When, Why and How, 36 RocKY MTN.
MN. L. INsr. 13-1 (1990); Kuntz, Gas Balancing Rights and Remedies in the Absence of a
Balancing Agreement, 35 RocKy MTN. Mw. L. INsr. 13-1 (1989); Borrego, Gas Balancing
Agreements, Selected Problems and Issues, 40 INsT. ON On. & GAS L. & TAx'N 4-1 (1989);
Hoefling, Gas Balancing Problems in a Deregulated Market: Changes and Possible Solutions
Under Oklahoma Law, 25 TuLsA L.J. 63 (1989); Lansdown, The Use of Gas Balancing Agreements
in Texas, CoRP. CouNs. REV., Nov. 1988, at 1; Penn, Cotenancy Problems: Is the Gas Balancing
Agreement the Answer?, 33 RocKY MTN. Mi. L. INsT. 18-1 (1988); Note, Oil & Gas: Gas
Balancing or Juggling? A Comprehensive Look At the Current State of Judicial and Contractual
Resolutions to Gas Balancing Problems, 41 OnA. L. Ray. 352 (1988); Smith, Gas Marketing by
Co-Owners: Disproportionate Sales, Gas Imbalances and Lessors' Claims to Royalty, 39 BAYLOR
259
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- the duty of the sellers of oil and gas production to account to the co-
owner whose ownership interest has been previously unrecognized. Before
discussing this particular problem, it is helpful to examine the problems of
gas balancing in general and the manner in which the courts have addressed
these problems.'
II. Gas Balancing - An Overview of the Problem
Gas balancing is necessitated when less than all of the owners of the right
to produce gas axe marketing their gas. When such a situation occurs, the
parties who are :marketing more than their pro rata share of the gas being
produced incur an obligation to account to the non-marketing owners. "Gas
balancing" is the term that has become identified as the method of ac-
counting among these owners. Depending upon the circumstances, the ac-
counting may be either in kind or by cash. In-kind balancing allows an
underproduced party to take a certain percentage of the overproduced
party's gas until the imbalance has been made up. Cash balancing requires
the overproduced party to pay cash to the underproduced party as compen-
sation for the gas sold over and above the overproduced party's share in
order to bring the gas accounts in balance. The reasons for a gas imbalance
cah be myriad. The problem was always apparent in split-stream sales, and
the earliest decisions involved owners contracting to sell their production to
different purchasers.4 One purchaser would begin purchasing gas prior to
the other, and the sellers would consequently be out of balance. These early
problems occurred at a time when there existed a sufficient market for all
gas with little price discrepancy and thus primarily involved volumetric
balancing problems. Today, the problems of a gas imbalance frequently
result from discriminatory purchasing practices of pipelines.5 Whatever the
L. Rv. 365 (1987); Watters, Gas Balancing, LANDMAN, Aug. 1986, at 45; Fell, Marketing of
Production from Properties Subject to Operating Agreements, 33 INST. ON OM & GAS L. &
TAx'N 115 (1982); Upchurch, Split Stream Gas Sales and the Gas Storage and Balancing
Agreement, 24 RocK"c MTN. MiN. L. INST. 665 (1978); Note, Oil and Gas: Production Imbalance
in Split Stream Gas Wells - Getting Your Fair Share, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 955 (1977); Ellis, The
Production of Gas from Joint Interest Properties, 21 INST. ON OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N 47 (1970);
Hillyer, Problems in Producing and Selling by Split or Single Stream, Gas Allocable to Diverse
Working Interest Ownerships, 16 INST. ON OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N 243 (1965).
3. Dean Kuntz points out that a comprehensive body of law has yet to develop on the
subject of gas balancing and that the courts have not always clearly articulated the theoretical
underpinnings of their decisions. Kuntz, supra note 2, at 13-4.
4. Bergen v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975); United Petroleum
Exploration Co. v. Premrere Resources, Ltd., 511 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. Okla. 1980). See generally
Hillyer, supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., Kaiser-Francis v. Producer's Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1989); Seal v.
Corp. Comm'n, 725 P.2d 278, 285 (Okla. 1986), cert. denied, Amerada Hess Corp. v. Corp.
Comm'n, 479 U.S. 1073 (1987). Many current problems result from the purchaser being unwilling
to purchase gas at prices previously contracted for, which it considers to be no longer market
clearing, i.e., it can no longer resell the gas at or above the contracted price. Frequently, the
purchaser will offer to purchase gas only at a reduced price. Some producers will choose to sell
[Vol. 44:259
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cause, many older fields and some more recent fields discovered in the wake
of the partial deregulation of the gas market by the Natural Gas Policy
Act 6 are beginning to deplete, and a flood of gas balancing litigation will
soon be washing up on the judicial beachheads.
7
In most typical drilling ventures, more than one party will own the
working interest rights, i.e., the right to drill for and hopefully produce oil
and gas in a proposed drilling unit. One of these owners will be selected as
the operator, who, in effect, becomes the managing partner of the drilling
venture,8 though the parties are loath to denominate themselves as partners. 9
Those owners consenting to the drilling operations will generally execute a
joint operating agreement (JOA), which is the basic contractual agreement
that will control the rights of the participating parties. 0 When the owners
of all the rights of production have consented to the drilling of the well
and entered into a JOA or some other type of agreement for sharing the
at a reduced price while others will not. For a revealing example of typical pipeline practices,
see Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. American Nat'l Petroleum Co., 763 S.W.2d 809,
813-14 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), wherein Transco admitted to implementing a policy of taking only
3% of the gas capacity of each producer who refused to sign Transco's "omnibus settlement
agreement" regardless of take-or-pay, minimum take or ratable take requirements in an effort
to pressure producers to waive liability claims against Transco and agree to a price considerably
less than their contract price. The Texas Supreme Court recently reinstated the trial court's jury
award of $16 million in exemplary damages against Transco for their conduct reversing the Court
of Appeal's decision that had reversed the judgment of exemplary damage. American Nat'l
Petroleum Co. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 798 S.W.2d 274, 275 (Tex. 1990).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
7. Dean Kuntz notes that gas balancing problems are not likely to correct themselves in an
amicable manner. Kuntz, supra note 2, at 13-3. Seminars on gas balancing litigation are becoming
a frequent occurrence.
8. See Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 282 Ark. 268, 668 S.W.2d 16
(1984); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 516 So. 2d 376, 392 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (m a compulsory
unit the "unit operator has become the managing partner for the purposes of exploration and
production"). See generally Boigon, The Joint Operating Agreement in A Hostile Environment,
38 INsT. ON Om & GAs L. & TAX'N § 5.02 (1987).
9. The standard form joint operating agreement will deny any attempt to form a partnership.
This provision is included primarily to attempt to avoid possible joint liability for debts unrelated
to the joint operations and other problems that would exist in a general partnership or mining
partnership. Penn, supra note 2, at 18-8. This denial has not precluded some courts from holding
the operator to fiduciary or trustee obligations that would exist in a normal partnership. See,
e.g., Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 282 Ark. 268, 668 S.W.2d 16 (1984);
Reserve Oil, Inc. v. Dixon, 711 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1983); Boigon, supra note 8, at 5-5 nn.4-7.
But see Wilson v. TXO Production Corp., 69 Bankr. 960, 964-65 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (Texas courts
hold that an operating agreement does not create a partnership between the operator and the
non-operators). One writer has opined that the relationship of the parties in a joint drilling
venture is that of partners, but to the extent a joint operating agreement has been executed the
partners have limited the partnership duties imposed among themselves. Note, The Oil and Gas
Unit Operator's Duty to Nonoperating Working Interest Owners, 1987 B.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1293,
1309-10.
10. Tenneco Oil Co. v. Bogert, 630 F. Supp. 961, 967 (W.D. Okla. 1986); Crosby-Mississippi
Resources v. Saga Petroleum U.S., Inc., 767 F.2d 143, 147 (5th Cir. 1985); Penn, supra note 2,
at 18-7; Note, supra note 9, at 1302.
1991]
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production, the court will generally look to the terms of the agreement to
ascertain the rights of the parties in the event of a gas imbalance." In an
effort to cope with the problems of gas imbalances, an instrument known
as a gas balancing agreement was developed to attempt to adjust and
reconcile the rights of the joint interest owners. Although most JOAs entered
into prior to the mid-to-late 1970s did not contain gas balancing agreements,
such an agreement is a standard attachment to most JOAs entered into
recently. However, there is certainly no standard form agreement in the
industry as yet.'7 Courts have so far applied the terms of the gas balancing
agreement, 3 or in the absence of any specific agreement applied "equitable
balancing" remedies which may result in either cash balancing 4 or balancing
in kind." In a cae in which the primary parties had never entered into
either a JOA or gas, balancing agreement, a Louisiana court held that under
its force-pooling laws, the commissioner of conservation had the power to
order a partition. of the unit production and require an accounting in kind
or in cash or could appoint a managing co-owner for the purpose of
"marketing all, or part, of the gas produced from a compulsory unit.' 6
III. The Legal Status of the Unrecognized Owner
None of the recent gas balancing decisions have involved a situation in
which the title of one party has not been recognized. Though some of the
11. Andrau v. Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 712 P.2d 372 (Wyo. 1986); Kuntz, supra
note 2, at 13-6; Martin, supra note 2, at 13-28.
12. Most gas balancing agreements currently in use were designed to address imbalances
arising from split stream sales and do not adequately cover many of the current problems of gas
imbalances. See Penn, supra note 2, at 18-43.
13. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 755 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985) (the
first reported decision construing the terms of a gas balancing agreement); Killgore v. Texaco,
Inc., No. 83-4826 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 1987) (1987 WESTLAW 6203) (an unreported Louisiana
federal district court case). In the first case, Belco sold all of the production from the well
without accounting to Chevron, who had elected to take its production in kind. The gas balancing
agreement did not specifically provide for cash balancing and the field depleted before Chevron
could balance in kind. The parties had considered a cash balancing provision but chose not to
include one in the agreement in order not to complicate the negotiations. Chevron sued for the
value of the gas production owed by Belco. The Fifth Circuit held for Belco, stating, "We read
the gas balancing agreement to unambiguously provide the exclusive means for Chevron and
Belco to bring their gas account into balance." Chevron U.S.A., 755 F.2d at 1154. This case
has been justly criticized as an extreme application of the terms of the gas balancing agreement.
Lansdown, supra note 2, at n.5. However, Louisiana courts apparently will strictly enforce the
terms of gas balancing egreements. See also Borrego, supra note 2, at 4-26 to -28. But see Pelto
Oil Co. v. CSX Oil & Gas Corp., 804 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1991) (gas balancing agreement
did not provide remedy when producer had in fact taken and marketed its share of production,
but unit operator had erroneously allocated production to another producer.
14. See, e.g., Beren v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
15. Pogo Producing Co. v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 898 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1990).
16. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 516 So. 2d 376, 393 (La. App. 1987). For a discussion
of the facts leading up to the court's decision in this very complex case, see Edwards, Current
Trends in Gas Marketing and Regulatory Responses Thereto, 32 1.sT. oN MIN. L. 19, 26-29
(1985). The court of appeals recently affirmed the commissioner's supplemental order on remand
which required a cash accounting for the period of time that the commissioner found the non-
taking parties lacked a viable market for their gas. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 566 So. 2d
138 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
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cases have dealt with situations where no gas balancing agreement existed
among the parties,17 the interest of the nonproducing party has always been
recognized.
The unrecognized owner stands in a different position than the recognized
owner who, for whatever reason, is not currently marketing production. If
someone's ownership is recognized, the operator, who controls the well's gas
flow and its allocation, 8 must select from among the available options the
manner in which the owner's interest is to be treated. Basically, the operator
may choose to purchase the nonmarketing party's gas under the operating
agreement and then resell it; he may sell the gas under the operating agreement
as agent for the party who lacks a gas contract; or he may bank that party's
gas pursuant to the terms of any applicable gas balancing agreement.' 9 How-
ever, when the owner's interest has never been recognized, the operator 20 must
of necessity be in the position of a cotenant in possession who is excluding
his cotenant. 2' Distinguished commentators and existing case law support just
this treatment - the law of cotenancy applies.3 While few "gas balancing"
decisions exist, cases are plentiful that apply the hoary laws of cotenancy to
oil and gas disputes.2
17. Beren v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975); Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Thompson, 516 So. 2d 376 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
18. While the operator might not control a pipeline's allocation among its various sellers, it
does control the well production and have the ultimate authority to allocate among the various
purchasers willing to accept gas. See Smith, supra note 2, at 390; Hoefling, supra note 2, at 94.
The operator is also under a duty to police the production of the well. Teel v. Public Serv. Co.,
767 P.2d 391, 397 (Okla. 1985); Borrego, supra note 2, at 4-12.
19. See Smith, supra note 2, at 369-71. The precise options available to the operator will
depend upon the terms of the JOA or an applicable statute. There are three versions of the
A.A.P.L. Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement currently in use: the 1956, 1977, and
1982 forms. A 1989 form has been published but is not yet in wide use. See section VI of this
article for a discussion of some recent gas marketing legislation.
20. Wherever the term "operator" is used herein, it refers to an operator who owns a working
interest in the gas unit, which is normally the case. Occasionally, the well will be operated by a
contract operator who owng no interest in the well. The contract operator, in such a case, would
be the agent for the producing cotenants who are parties to the JOA. Neeley v. Intercity
Management Corp., 732 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
21. The producing cotenant might argue that he has not excluded the cotenant from drilling
his own well assuming the property in which the parties are cotenants was large enough to
include more than one unit. However, the parties are cotenants in the production from the well
and the unrecognized cotenant has by definition been excluded from the well production. A
cotenant's right of possession extends to the whole property and no cotenant has the right to
exclusive possession of any part of the whole. 4 THomPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, § 1793, at 139
(1979) [hereinafter TnompsoN]; Knight, Cotenancy - A Sometimes Unholy Alliance, 33 INST.
ON Om & GAS L. & TAx'N 225, 227 (1982). Thus, to the extent an owner's interest has not been
recognized by the operator, he has been excluded from possessing his share of the well's
production.
22. See, e.g., Wilson v. TXO Production Corp., 69 Bankr. 960, 966 (N.D. Tex. 1987); Byrom
v. Pendley, 717 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1986); MCZ, Inc. v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986); Dilworth v. Fortier, 405 P.2d 38 (Okla. 1964); Kuntz, supra note 2, at 13-5; Penn, supra
note 2, at 18-4; J. LowE, On. An GAs LAw IN A Nursmn 394 (1988).
23. See cases cited in E. Ktmrrz, A TanEArs ON THE LAW OF O AND GAS § 5.2-4 (1978);
Annotation, Rights of Cotenants' Inter se as to Oil and Gas, 40 A.L.R. 1400 (1926), supplemented
1991]
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If the operator has refused or neglected to recognize a cotenant's interest,
the cotenant must be considered to have been excluded from participating
in the joint operation or the production from the well by the operator,
since the operator has the exclusive right to determine how the well should
be produced and who shall participate in its production.24 There are many
reasons why someone's ownership might not be recognized.
The operator may have construed the interest to be a nonparticipating
royalty interest rather than a mineral interest.Y Leases may have been taken
from a life tenant, but from less than all the remaindermen.26 A cotenancy
may have resulted from an inheritance in which heirship disputes exist and
less than all of the cotenant heirs may have leased.27 The operator may
have thought that a lease on one's interest was defective or expired when,
in fact, it was still valid.m Some of the leases held by an operator may have
expired prior to the well being drilled. 29 An overproduced party might file
for bankruptcy and reject the gas balancing agreement. 30 Alternately, the
mineral interest might be split into numerous small interests, and an operator
will feel that it is not economic to attempt to locate and lease all of the
small interests and will simply ignore the interest. Whatever the reason, it
is not infrequent that someone who owns a mineral or leasehold working
interest will not have that interest recognized until sometime after the well
has produced. Consequently, the right of these unrecognized owners to the
production from the well, both past and future, must be dealt with.
IV. The Development of the Law of Cotenancy
Cotenancy in property arises when two or more persons become owners
of property in such a manner that they have an undivided right of possession.
The only element essential to a cotenancy is the right of simultaneous
possession.31
by 91 A.L.R. 205 (1934); Annotation, Basis of Computation of Cotenants' Accountability for
Minerals and Timber Removed from the Property, 5 A.L.R. 2d 1368 (1949).
24. See Smith, supra note 2, at 390.
25. Thornhill v. Systems Fuel, Inc., 523 So. 2d 983 (Miss. 1988).
26. Martin v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 199 F. Supp. 648 (S.D. Miss. 1960), aff'd, 298 F.2d
163 (5th Cir. 1961); MCZ, Inc. v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
27. Johnson v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 90 Kan. 565, 135 P. 589 (1913).
28. Byrom v. Pendley, 717 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1986).
29. Wickham v. Skelly Oil Co., 106 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Okla. 1952).
30. See generally Penn, supra note 2, at 18-25 to -27. Homer Penn concludes that after
rejection of the gas balancing agreement, the underproduced parties are left with a monetary
claim against the bankrupt to be paid or discharged in the bankruptcy, and that any entity
purchasing the assets of the bankrupt will be treated as a cotenant. Id. Frequently, after
bankruptcy the operator will refuse to allocate any gas to the account of the "overproduced"
bankrupt party, effectively refusing to recognize his interest.
31. THompsoN, supra note 21. "Tenancies in common differ in nothing from sole estates but
merely in the blending end unity of possession." 2 W. Br.Ac csrON, Commm4TAFis ON Tim LAws
oF ENGLAND 194 (1979). There are six common types of co-ownership: tenancy in common, joint
tenancy, tenancy by the entirety, coparcenary, community property, and partnership property.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss2/4
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In feudal England, land was frequently held in tenure for life or for a
period of years. There had long existed in Medieval England a common
law action for waste against a life tenant or a tenant for years. 2 This
concept of waste is easily understood. Someone who has been granted
possession of property for a limited period of time is expected to return
the property at the end of his ownership in as good a condition as it was
when it was received except for normal wear and tear. If the permanent
value of the property is diminished during the life tenant or tenant for
years' tenure, the tenant has committed waste against the reversionary estate
for which the law will hold the tenant liable.
The concept of waste by a cotenant in the fee is not as easily understood
as waste by a cotenant whose tenure is of limited duration. Prior to the
enactment of the Statute of Westminster II in 1285, nothing prohibited a
cotenant in the fee from extracting valuable substances from the land held
in cotenancy, without any accounting to his cotenants. 33 This statute pro-
vided for a writ of waste in favor of one cotenant against another.14 The
offending cotenant was given the option of accepting partition in kind and
being allocated the depleted portion of the land, or refraining from any
further depletion of the land, except to the extent the other cotenants did
so." Some four centuries later, in 1705, the Statute of Anne was enacted
which allowed an action for an accounting by one cotenant against another
for receiving more than the cotenant's just share or proportion of substances
from the land.3 6 Thus, the Statute of Westminster established that no
cotenant of the fee could engage in waste against the commonly owned
property (without defining waste), and the Statute of Anne established
accounting as a remedy when a cotenant consumed more than the cotenant's
share. It is from these early English statutes that the common lav of
cotenancy has evolved in American jurisdictions.
V. The Modern Application of Cotenancy Laws
to Oil and Gas Disputes
A. The Early Decisions - Majority and Minority Rule
The earliest questions that arose in applying the laws of cotenancy to oil
and gas matters dealt with the threshold issues of who were cotenants and
whether cotenants or their lessees could produce oil or gas without the
E. Kuncz, supra note 23, § 5.1. For purposes of this article, the incidents of distinction of these
various types of ownership are not important.
32. See Kimbrough, Law of Waste in Mississippi Territory and State, 7 Mss. L.J. 234, 258-
59 (1935). This common law action was restated and additional remedies added by the Statutes
of Marlbridge (1257) and Gloucester (1268). Id.
33. See E. Kuirz, supra note 23, § 5.2; W. BLAcIsToN r, supra note 31. See generally
AMERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.15 (1952).
34. E. Kuirrz, supra note 23, § 5.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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consent of all the other cotenants. Early on the courts established, with
unanimity, that owners of undivided mineral interests are tenants in common37
and that a lessee of a cotenant stands in the shoes of the lessor, becoming
a cotenant with the lessor's cotenants. 3 However, a split of authority
developed as to precisely what rights a cotenant has to drill for, produce
and market oil and gas from the common property. A majority of the
states that confronted this issue established that because of the very nature
of minerals, a cotenant has the right to drill for and produce oil and gas
without the consent of the cotenants, subject to the duty to account for the
value of the production sold, less expenses.3 9 The majority rule and the
policy behind its adoption is aptly stated by the Texas Supreme Court:
It has long been the rule in Texas that a cotenant has the right
to extract minerals from common property without first obtaining
the consent of his cotenants; however, he must account to them
on the basis of the value of any minerals taken, less the necessary
and reasonable costs of production and marketing. The rule
announced in Burnham and reaffirmed in Cox is founded on the
distinctive legal relationship existing between cotenants; that is,
each cotenant has a right to enter upon the common estate and
a corollary right to possession. In establishing this rule, the
Burnham court was guided by strong policy considerations:
[The peculiar circumstances of a cotenancy in land
upon which oil is discovered warrant one cotenant to
proceed and utilize the oil, without the necessity of
the other cotenants concurring. Oil is a fugitive sub-
stance! and may be drained from the land by well on
adjoining property. It must be promptly taken from
the land for it to be secured to the owners.
40
The majority rule has been adopted in Alabama, 4' California
4 2
Florida, 43  Georgia, 44  Kansas, 41 Kentucky, 46  Mississippi, 47
37. See THOmpsoN, supra note 21, § 1793, at 137; E. KuNTz, supra note 23, § 5.1, at 137.
38. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 1924) (a cotenant's "lessee
upon entry will become for the time being a tenant in common with the other owners and
entitled to the same rights in relation to the other cotenants that his lessor had.")
39. See E. Kmrz, supra note 23, § 5.
40. Byrom v. Pendley, 717 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1986) (citations omitted).
41. Sun Oil Co. v. Oswell, 62 So. 2d 783 (Ala. 1953). But see Clark v. Whitfield, 119 So.
631 (Ala. 1928).
42. Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal. 2d 637, 52 P.2d 237 (1935).
43. P & N Investment Corp. v. Florida Ranchettes, Inc., 220 So. 2d 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969).
44. Slade v. Rudman Resources, Inc., 237 Ga. 848, 230 S.E.2d 284 (1976).
45. Prewett v. Van Pelt, 118 Kan. 571, 235 P. 1059 (Kan. 1925); Krug v. Krug, 5 Kan. App.
2d 426, 618 P.2d 322- (1980).
46. Stephens v. Click, 287 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1955).
47. Mills v. Damson Oil Corp., 931 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1991); Martin v. Humble Oil Ref.
Co., 199 F. Supp. 6,18 (S.D. Miss. 1960), aff'd, 298 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1961). Martin involved
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Missouri, 4s Montana, 49 North Dakota,50 Oklahoma,5 Pennsylvania, 52
Texas,5 3 and Wyoming.
5 4
A minority of the states, however, conclude that a cotenant does not
have the right to produce oil and gas without the consent of the cotenants
in the absence of exigent circumstances such as drainage.55 This position
has been adopted by Illinois 5 6 Louisiana,57 Michigan,58 and West Virginia. 9
The West Virginia court articulated this position in Law v. Heck:60
To permit the defendant company to proceed with its proposed
development of the oil and gas underlying the land in question
without the plaintiff's consent, even though the company should
faithfully turn over to the plaintiff his full proportionate share
of such minerals, or account to him therefor, without cost of
production, would be a compelling of the plaintiff to exchange
his real estate for personal property. This the law will not require
on a showing such as is here presented.
6'
Some writers have opined that this different treatment by the states is a
result of different views of waste. 62 Thus, the minority rule views any
a life estate and remainder interest and not cotenants in the fee. However, Mississippi probably
falls in the majority rule jurisdictions. See Damson Oil Corp. v. Southeastern Oil Co., 370 So.
2d 225, 227 (Miss. 1979); cf. Miles v. Fink, 119 Miss. 147, 80 So. 532 (1919).
48. Davis v. Byrd, 238 Mo. App. 581, 185 S.W.2d 866 (1945).
49. Marias River Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co., 599 Mont. 254, 38 P.2d 599 (1934).
50. Schank v. North Am. Royalties, Inc., 201 N.W.2d 419 (N.D. 1972).
51. Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okla. 86, 27 P.2d 855 (1933).
52. Lichtenfels v. Bridgeview Coal Co., 344 Pa. Super. 257, 496 A.2d 782 (1985), on appeal,
366 Pa. Super. 304, 531 A.2d 22 (1987), alloc. denied, 539 A.2d 812 (1988); McIntosh v. Ropp,
233 Pa. 497, 82 A. 949 (1912).
53. Byrom v. Pendley, 717 S.W.2d 602 (rex. 1986); Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200 (rex.
1965); Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), aff'd, 195 S.W. 1139
(rex. 1917).
54. Torgeson v. Connelly, 348 P.2d 63, 70 (Wyo. 1959).
55. See E. KLtrz, supra note 23, § 5.
56. Zeigler v. Brenneman, 237 Ill. 15, 86 N.E. 597, 601 (1908); Murray v. Haverty, 70 Il1.
318 (1873); Fyffe v. Fyffe, 11 N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ili. Ct. App. 1937). By statutory enactments,
Illinois has considerably lessened its application of the minority rule. See E. KuNTz, supra note
23, § 5.4, at 142; Smith, Evolution of Oil and Gas Rights in the Eastern United States, 10 E.
Min. L. INST. 16-1, 16-40 (1989).
57. Gulf Ref. Co. v. Carroll, 145 La. 299, 82 So. 277 (1919). An exception to the rule
requiring consent of all cotenants for drilling is now provided by statute when the drilling is
done to prevent waste or the extinguishment of a servitude, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:176 (West
1989), or an undivided 80% interest consents, id. § 31:175.
58. See Hennes v. Charles Hebard & Sons, 135 N.W. 1073 (Mich. 1912). Like Illinois,
Michigan has ameliorated the effect of this position by authorizing development of the land by
less than all the cotenants pursuant to statute. See MIcH. Comps. LAWS Am. §§ 319.101-.110
(West 1984).
59. E.g., United Fuel Gas Co. v. Koontz, 113 W. Va. 611, 169 S.E. 328 (X. Va. 1933).
60. 106 W. Va. 296, 145 S.E. 601 (1928).
61. Id., 145 S.E. at 602.
62. See Hurtt & Jordan, Co-Ownership: The Problems It Creates for the Oil & Gas Producers,
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exploitation of the mineral interest as waste that may be enjoined by a
cotenant unless drainage is established, while the majority rule views pro-
duction of oil and gas to be a customary and natural use of mineral property.
Undoubtedly, the courts' views on what constitutes waste by a cotenant of
the fee impacted these early decisions. The court's decision in the landmark
case of Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen63 clearly articulates the majority view
of waste:
Tenants in common are the owners of the substance of the estate.
They may make such reasonable use of the common property as
is necessary to enjoy the benefit and value of such ownership.
Since an estate of a cotenant in a mine or oil well can only be
enjoyed by removing the products thereof, the taking of mineral
from a mine and the extraction of oil from an oil well are the
use and not the destruction of the estate. This being true, a
tenant in common, without the consent of his cotenant, has the
right to develop and operate the common property for oil and
gas and for that purpose may drill wells and erect necessary
plants. He must not, however, exclude his cotenant from exer-
cising the same rights and privileges."
However, it appears that the divergence in opinions is as much a question
of policy as it is a difference in viewing the law of waste. 65 The court in
Prairie also noted that allowing a single cotenant to deprive the other co-
owners of their opportunity to promptly secure a fugacious substance such.
as oil could arbitrarily destroy that which constituted the primary value of
the land.6 The majority rule encourages development of the mineral interest,
somewhat at the expense of the individual rights of the cotenant. 67 The
minority rule jealously protects the right of the individual cotenant at the
expense of the rights of the other cotenants and undoubtedly discourages
development. 6
6 E. MiN. L. INsT. 16-1, 16-4 (1985); Shepherd, Problems Incident to Joint Ownership of the
Oil and Gas Leasehold Estate, 5 INsT. oN On. & GAs L. & TAx'N 215-33 (1954); E. KuN-rz,
supra note 23, § 5.2, at 139. Dean Kuntz points out that the majority rule amounts to a
"recognition that the concept of waste applicable to tenants for life or for years is not applicable
to cotenants in the fee." Id. § 5.3, at 141.
63. 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1926).
64. Id. at 571.
65. Some of the early decisions viewed the depletion of mineral resources as waste, but
refused to hold a cotenant liable for conversion (trover), rather finding that such action gave
rise to an action at law for waste or in equity for an accounting for waste. See, e.g., Clark v.
Whitefield, 218 Ala. 593, 119 So. 631, 633 (1928).
66. Prairie Oil & Ge, 2 F.2d at 571.
67. Professor Lowe is somewhat skeptical that the majority rule encourages development
feeling that it is not often relied upon unless the nonconsenting interest is small. J. LowE, supra
note 22, at 92-93.
68. The enactment of statutes diminishing the impact of the court position in all of the
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The majority rule recognized the realities of the rule of capture and the
burden that this rule of property placed on land, owned in cotenancy,
establishing as a policy that cotenants could proceed to develop the com-
monly-owned land so long as they were willing to do so at their own risk.69
These jurisdictional differences are less important now due to the enactment
of conservation laws that basically control who is entitled to drill for oil
and gas and the spacing patterns of wells in the producing states.
B. The Duty to Account
1. General Statement of Duty
All of the states that have considered the issue have concluded that a
producing cotenant is obligated to account to the nonproducing cotenant
for his share of the market value of the oil and gas produced, less the
necessary expense of developing, producing and marketing the product.
70
Even in those jurisdictions in which a cotenant is not authorized to produce
oil and gas from commonly owned lands without the consent of all coten-
ants, the nonconsenting cotenants may waive the tort and sue for an
accounting.7' Though there exists a plethora of cases that reiterate this
universal rule of accounting, few expound on the nature of this duty to
account. Several early cases indicated that a producing cotenant must ac-
count to the nonproducing cotenant either for the market value of the
material sold less expenses or "the universal and customary royalty paid
for the right of mining" the particular product. 72 This rule has basically
been developed by the courts to allow the nonconsenting cotenant to ratify
the consenting cotenant's lease and accept royalty thereunder or reject the
lease and receive a share of the oil and gas produced, less part of the cost
of discovery and production .7  Though the cases are not numerous, there
minority rule states save West Virginia attests to the fact that legislators felt a need to alter the
rule to encourage development.
69. It should be kept in mind that the early oil and gas court decisions were made at a time
when the laws of nature that govern how oil and gas actually exist underground were not properly
comprehended. This led the courts to analogize to what they did comprehend - "wild animals"
and "underground streams," the laws of ferae naturae. Thus, the rule of capture was devised
as a rule of property as to the ownership of oil and gas providing that so long as a well was
located on one's property, title was acquired to all of the oil and gas the well "captured," i.e.,
produced. This led to a race to drill wells as quickly as possible in order to produce and thus,
acquire title to as much oil and gas as possible. The negative effects of the rule of capture, and
the reckless development to which it led, gave rise to modern conservation laws. See generally
Shepherd, supra note 62; Pierce, Reconciling State Oil and Gas Conservation Regulation with
the Natural Gas Act: New Statutory Revelation, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 9; Smith, supra note 56.
70. See E. KuNTz, supra note 23, § 5.6.
71. See, e.g., Dangerfield v. Caldwel, 151 F. 554 (4th Cir. 1907) (a West Virginia case).
72. See, e.g., New Domain Oil & Gas Co. v. McKinney, 188 Ky. 183, 221 S.W. 245, 250
(1920).
73. See, e.g., Davis v. Atlantic Oil Producing Co., 87 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1936).
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are some decisions that address various issues that must be faced in ac-
counting to the unrecognized owner.
2. Who Must Account?
The numerous cases reiterating the rule of accounting to nonconsenting
cotenants generally recite that the "producing" 74 or "developing '"7 cotenant
has a duty to account. Does this mean only the well operator or all owners
who own a working interest in the producing well? A distinction should be
made here between a suit to establish the title of the unrecognized cotenant
and a suit for an accounting or damages. Clearly, all parties whose title
would be adversely affected should be joined in a suit where the title of
the excluded cotenant is contested. But after one's title has been established
and is no longer contested, who has the duty to account? Although very
little authority exi;ts on this subject, at least one Texas court has faced this
precise issue and has held that the well operator is the only necessary party.
In MCZ, Inc. v. Smith,7 6 MCZ acquired by assignment a lease from the
owner of an undivided one-half interest in the property and a life estate in
the remaining one-half interest. The owner of one-half of the one-half
remainder interest was listed as a lessor in the lease, though the capacity in
which he signed was disputed. However, it was undisputed that the owners
of the other one-half of the remainder interest never leased to MCZ or its
assignors. The original lessees assigned the lease to MCZ, reserving an
overriding royalty interest. MCZ then assigned 90% of the lease in question
to eight other parties.
A producing well was drilled on the lease, and the owners of the unleased
remainder interest then leased to one Arthur Smith. Smith and his lessors
then sued only MCZ, seeking royalties, an accounting, and damages for
waste, interest, and costs. MCZ argued that all of the other owners of the
lease, both overriding royalty interest and working interest, should have
been joined as parties to the suit. However, the trial court rejected this
argument, and the appellate court affirmed, stating:
MCZ's relationship with and liability to Armstrong and Bailey
[the remainder interest not leased to MCZ] arises from the law
of cotenancy, not from a contractual relationship. A cotenant,
such as MCZ, who produces oil and gas from commonly owned
property without first having 'secured the consent of its cotenants,
is liable to the non-producing cotenants for minerals produced,
less reasonable costs of production and marketing. As the op-
erator of the Philipello well, MCZ became the producing cotenant
to the Armstrong-Beasley remainder interest, and MCZ's pro-
duction triggered its duty under Texas law to account to remain-
74. E.g., MCZ, Inc. v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 672, 678 (rex. Ct. App. 1986); Schank v. North
Am. Royalties, Inc., 201 N.W.2d 419, 429 (N.D. 1972).
75. Martin v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 199 F. Supp. 648 (S.D. Miss. 1960).
76. 707 S.W.2d 672 (rex. Ct. App. 1986).
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der interests for minerals produced, less proportionate reasonable
costs. As operator, MCZ alone was responsible under the law of
cotenancy to account to its cotenant remaindermen, just as it
was responsible under the lease to account to its assignors and
assignees.
77
MCZ further argued on appeal that the trial court had improperly found
that it "held" the lease in question (since it had assigned 90% of the lease
to others) ind had been the collecting agent for all proceeds from the sale
of oil and gas.78 The court of appeals brushed aside this argument, declaring:
MCZ's sole responsibility to account occurs because it is the
appellees' producing cotenant who has severed and extracted
minerals from the co-owned tract, collected monies, and refused
to pay over to co-owner appellees .... MCZ's liability has
nothing to do with the percentage of the lease it "holds," but
results from MCZ's having acquired money due appellees from
operating the well.
79
Thus, the operator is certainly a producing cotenant and may be the only
party who is required to account to the nonconsenting cotenants. In most
cases, this is not unreasonable. The operator is the one who has chosen to
exclude the cotenant, s0 and the fact that it may have paid production
proceeds attributable to the interest of the excluded cotenant to the wrong
parties should not require the excluded cotenant to seek redress from those
parties. The operator is the one who will have any rights of indemnity or
other recourse against those parties it has chosen to pay.
As a practical matter, it may be exceedingly difficult for the excluded
cotenant to know where the ultimate liability may rest. Who may be
responsible to the operator usually will be the result of the contractual
arrangements between the operator and the nonoperating working interest
owners whom the operator has recognized. The standard joint operating
agreement provides two basic methods of dealing with loss of title by parties
to the agreement, joint loss or individual loss.8 ' In addition, the status of
the gas balancing account among the recognized owners might impact on
who among them is liable ultimately for the wrongful appropriation of the
excluded cotenant's gas. Frequently, the arrangements are further compli-
77. Id. at 676 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 678. The only evidence that the court's opinion cites to support the finding that
MCZ had control of funds for disbursement and was the collecting agent for proceeds of oil
and gas sales, was testimony that it had suspended funds attributable to appellees' interest and
that it had accrued royalties for lessors that it had not paid out.
79. Id.
80. The court in MCZ, Inc. noted that title opinions secured by MCZ as operator of the
well had pointed out that a portion of the remainder interest was not under lease to MCZ, Inc.
Id. at 676. The operator is in charge of the well's production and must determine what interest
it will recognize as valid.
81. Conine, Property Provision of the Operating Agreement-Interpretation, Validity and
Enforceability, 19 Tax. TECH L. Ray. 1263, 1351 (1988).
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cated by fieldwide gas exchanges that allocate and balance gas accounts
among the recognized parties in the field, which might result in a working
interest owner who has no record interest whatsoever in the particular well
being allocated all of the gas produced by that well. The operator is often
the only party knowing who has and who has not sold gas.
The operator is the logical and proper person to be held liable to the
excluded cotenant to account for the proceeds attributable to the cotenant's
interest. The operator is charged with the duty to defend claims against the
joint account and police the production from the well.12 The operator can
seek contribution from all parties it believes are liable. Often one of the
working interest owners who has been paid is in bankruptcy at the time of
the accounting to the excluded cotenant. The operator quite naturally wants
to shift that loss to the excluded cotenant. Normally, the operator should
not be allowed to.83
When the excluded cotenant has made known a claim, there is a com-
pelling reason for holding the operator responsible. A prudent operator
should either suspend proceeds when an adverse claim has been made or
require appropriate indemnity from the parties whose interest are affected
by any adverse claim. Thus, certainly after the excluded cotenant's claim
of title is made known, the operator has every opportunity to protect itself
and the recognized working interest owners. If it falls to do so, it should
expect to suffer any adverse consequences. A prudent operator should
likewise not distribute proceeds until it has obtained title opinions from
reputable counsel certifying the title of the various owners. In cases in which
the title attorney has miscertified the status of the title, the attorney will be
liable to the party to whom the title opinion was rendered.4
It would seem that all of the recognized working interest owners in a
well who have sold production would be considered producing cotenants
and, thus, liable to account.85 When it can be shown that the operator
served as the collecting agent for the well's production, the operator alone
can be held responsible to account. 86 When split stream connections exist,
82. Teel v. PubEe Serv. Co., 767 P.2d 391, 397 (Okla. 1985); Ellis, supra note 2, at 80.
83. Equitable deten.es such as laches would be available to the operator should the facts of
the particular case warrant them.
84. Lear, First Purchaser Suspense Accounts, 33 RocKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 17-1, 17-2
(1988); see, e.g., Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690, 693 (lex. 1986) (court noted
that a third-party cros i-action had been filed by the operator against the title attorney who
miscertified the title in the title opinion which the operator relied on to prepare its division
order).
85. The liability of cotenants qua cotenants is several, not joint. A nonproducing cotenant
may choose to sue lss than all of the producing cotenants and the action will be entertained so
long as the relief sought will not adversely affect the rights of those cotenants not joined. Cowling
v. Deep Vein Coal Co., 183 F.2d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 1950); Guth v. Texas Co., 155 F.2d 563
(7th Cir. 1946); Martin v. Humble Oil Ref. Co., 199 F. Supp. 648 (S.D. Miss. 1960), aff'd, 298
F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1961); Hendricks v. Hendricks, 215 Ala. 646, 112 So. 219 (1927); Armstrong
v. Armstrong, 185 N.Y.S. 853 (N.Y. 1920).
86. MCZ, Inc. v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
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and the operator can prove that other working interest owners took their
production in kind, it might be necessary to join all such parties in any suit
for an accounting. This would certainly be the safest course.
3. Accounting in Kind - Your Gas Is Still in the Ground
When demand is made on the producing cotenant to account to the
previously unrecognized cotenant for proceeds of past production, the re-
sponse in a falling market will almost always be, "I have only sold my gas,
your gas is still in the ground. ' s7 How valid is this response? It is neither
valid nor new. The courts considering cases involving hard minerals have
rejected this argument and have held as a matter of law that the producing
cotenants have produced the well or mine on behalf of all cotenants. ss These
cases dealing with hard minerals properly apply the law of cotenancy. There
should be no reason to apply a different rule to gas than to hard minerals. 9
An interesting Texas case, White v. Smyth, 9° considered this question of
"involuntary gas banking," albeit in the context of a suit for partition by
sale of the rock asphalt estate in a large tract of land, coupled with an
accounting for the asphalt removed from the common property. In White,
the defendant owned a one-ninth interest in 30,000 acres of land and had
for some time mined the rock asphalt on some 200 acres thereof, failing to
account to the cotenants. The court in White noted that it was faced with
a case of first impression in Texas as to the duty of a co-owner who takes
solid minerals to account to cotenants, but analogized to the well-recognized
Texas rule regarding oil and gas that requires the producing cotenant to
account to the nonproducing cotenant for the proceeds of the oil and gas
sold, less expenses.9' The defendant contended that the general rule requiring
an accounting did not apply "because he ha[d] mined no more than his
fair share of the rock asphalt in place and ha[d] not excluded them [the
cotenants] from the premises." 92 The court rejected this argument, citing
with approval, inter alia, a Connecticut decision93 for the proposition:
87. In a situation of rising gas prices, the response will be different. If the producer can
currently sell gas at a higher price than that previously received, he will gladly account to the
previously unrecognized cotenant at the lower price rather than forego current production at a
higher price.
88. White v. Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 967 (Tex. 1948); Campbell v. Homer Ore Co., 309 Mich.
693, 16 N.W.2d 125, 127 (1944); Memphis Stone & Gravel Co. v. Archer, 137 Miss. 558, 102
So. 390, 391 (1925); Cosgriff v. Dewey, 47 N.Y.S. 255 (App. Div. 1897), aff'd, 58 N.E. 1 (N.Y.
1900); Barnum v. Landon, 25 Conn. 137, 150 (1856).
89. Kuntz, supra note 2, at 13-9. The article states, in pertinent part:
The principles applicable to a gas imbalance between cotenants should be the same
as the principles applicable to an imbalance created by the taking of other minerals
or timber, although an application of those principles to gas should take into
account the peculiar physical characteristics of gas and any peculiarities in the
practices of marketing gas.
Id.
90. 214 S.W.2d 967 (Tex. 1948).
91. Id. at 975.
92. Id.
93. Barnum v. Landon, 25 Conn. 137 (1856).
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The error of the defendants lies in this: They contend they own
absolutely whatever they get out of the ore pit if it is not too
much, whereas they own only one/twenty-fourth part of what
they get out, and must account at reasonable times, for the other
twenty-three parts, to the plaintiffs.9
The Court further declared:
The ownership of all of the cotenants extends to all of the rock
asphalt, and White was not authorized to make partition of it.
We approve the conclusion on this point thus well expressed by
Associate Justice Norvell, writing the opinion of the Court of
Civil Appeals in this case:
"On the other hand, if the mineral estate be not partitionable
in kind, it follows that although a cotenant may be entitled to
partition, he is not entitled to a partition in kind, consequently,
his taking of minerals prior to partition can not be regarded as
vesting absolute title of the several minerals in the taker. On the
contrary, the title to the several minerals remains in all the
cotenants in their proportionate interests. The minerals not being
partitionable in kind, the substantive right of cotenants desiring
division or partition is the right to have the estate or minerals
sold and the proceeds thereof divided. It follows, therefore, that
the title of the non-operating cotenant in and to the extracted
minerals does not terminate until said minerals are disposed of
by sale, or until they are brought to a place or point where there
exists an established market value for such minerals. His rights
thereupon attach to the proceeds."
The facts of this case attest the obvious soundness of the rule
that a cotenant cannot select and take for himself part of the
property jointly owned and thus make partition. 95
The same argument, that the producing cotenant had not taken more
than his pro rata share of the minerals and thus had no duty to account,
was rejected by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Memphis Stone & Gravel
Co. v. Archer,9 as follows:
It is further contended by the appellants that since they own an
undivided two-thirds interest in this property and that they have
not taken their share of the gravel from the land, they should
not be held liable to their cotenant. They have been in the
exclusive possession of the entire property and are accountable
to their cotenant for her share of the gravel removed.Y
93. Barnum v. Lndon, 25 Conn. 137 (1856).
94. White, 214 S.W.2d at 977.
95. Id. at 976 (quoting White v. Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 953, 961 (rex. Civ. App. 1947)).
96. 137 Miss. 558, 102 So. 390 (1925).
97. Id., 102 So. at 391.
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Thus, these early cases dealing with hard minerals conclude that cotenants
own every particle of the common property, and no cotenant may unilat-
erally partition the property by claiming some particular portion of it as
his own. They also appear to this writer to say that the ownership extends
to the extracted minerals, though in a qualified sense.98 Any cotenant has
the right to sell the extracted mineral, but the cotenant's ownership interest
will then attach to the proceeds of the sale by virtue of the cotenant's
entitlement to an accounting." It is not unlike partnership property, which
is a species of co-ownership. Any partner in a general partnership may be
authorized to sell the partnership property and deliver good title to the
purchaser.100 However, if the proceeds of the sale are converted to the
private use of the selling partner, the seller is liable to the partners for
conversion. Likewise, if a cotenant sells commonly owned gas and then
refuses to account to the cotenants, the cotenant is liable to them for their
share of the property sold.10
Court decisions dealing with oil and gas cotenancies repeatedly recite that
a cotenant may not exclude concurrent owners from exercising their right
to produce minerals from the common property.1°2 Thus, it would naturally
follow that insofar as a cotenant's interest has not been previously recog-
nized, the cotenant has been excluded from the common property, and the
producing cotenant must account for the other's share of the commonly
owned oil and gas that has been sold. The producing cotenant cannot simply
say that the previously excluded cotenant is now free to go and market the
98. Dean Kuntz, in his analysis of White, found nothing to suggest that the cotenants owned
an undivided interest in the severed minerals. Kuntz, supra note 2, at 13-10. He opines that the
common law rights of a cotenant do not include the acquisition of title in minerals extracted by
another cotenant, though the right to an accounting for profits make the economic consequences
similar. Id. at 13-13, -14. In this writer's opinion, some of the cases, including White, do hold
that the cotenants own an undivided interest in extracted minerals, but that ownership is not
unqualified. The extracted minerals are a part of the substance of the fee and as such, each
molecule is owned by the tenants in common. If they are extracted and stored, they would still
be owned by all of the cotenants; but once sold, the nonconsenting cotenant must look to his
selling cotenant for an accounting. This does not detract from what appears to be the thrust of
Dean Kuntz's argument - that the sale by a cotenant of 100% of the oil and gas produced by
a well does not give rise to a claim for conversion, a position that it appears the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has now come around to. Compare Anderson v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 782
P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1989) with Teel v. Public Serv. Co., 767 P.2d 391 (Okla. 1985). However, a
refusal of the cotenant to account for the proceeds of such a sale should be grounds for a claim
of conversion. Cf. Van Zandt v. Van Zandt, 227 Miss. 528, 86 So. 2d 466 (1956).
99. White v. Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 967 (Tex. 1948); Dangerfield v. Caldwell, 151 F. 554, 559
(4th Cir. 1907).
100. THoMpsoN, supra note 21, § 1832, at 345.
101. Cf. Van Zandt v. Van Zandt, 227 Miss. 528, 86 So. 2d 466 (1956) (cotenant holding
power of attorney from other cotenants who sold timber from cotenancy land without disclosing
sale or money received to other cotenants, deposited proceeds to own bank account and refused
to account is guilty of concealed fraud and must pay the other cotenants their share of sale
proceeds plus interest).
102. See, e.g., Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 571 (8th Cir. 1924); Davis v. Byrd,
185 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945); Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okla. 86,
27 P.2d 855 (1933).
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cotenant's share of the commonly owned remaining gas. Under the estab-
lished laws of cotenancy, a cotenant must offer to account to other cotenants
for the value of the oil and gas previously sold.' 03
4. Accounting in Value - The Measure of the Accounting
a) Market Value or Proceeds
When the product that has been produced is oil, there is little argument
over the price at which the producing cotenant must account. There usually
exists a posted price in the field for oil sold, and it can be readily ascertained.
Gas is a different matter. Identical molecules of gas flowing out of the
same well bore may have been sold for prices varying by 1,000%. Finding
out the precise price paid for gas can often be an arduous undertaking.
Must the producing cotenant account for the gas sold at the fair market
value of the gas at the time it was sold, the actual proceeds received from
the sale, or some other price?
The early cases dealing with cotenancy accounting generally discuss this
issue only superficially. The standard rule recited is that the producing
cotenant must account for the market value of the gas at the time it was
sold. 14 But what is market value? There has been a great deal of litigation
involving the construction of royalty clauses requiring the payment for gas
based on market value. The courts in these cases have split regarding the
question of whether the lessee's contract price establishes the market value
or whether the market value should be independently established at the time
of production.os The Texas courts in the market value royalty cases, while
generally requiring market value to be established at the time of production,
have stated that this market value should be determined by "sales of gas
comparable in time, quality and availability to marketing outlets."'' 06 After
fifteen years of litigation and establishing that they were entitled to be paid
royalties based on the market value of gas at the time it was produced,
some Mississippi royalty owners were instructed by the trial court that the
"market value" of their gas was the long-term contract price at which the
lessee sold.'17
These market value royalty cases may not be truly analogous to a coten-
ancy accounting situation. Most of these cases involve consideration of
103. Jones v. Strauss, 745 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. 1988); see Moody v. Wagner, 167 Okla. 99, 23
P.2d 633 (1933) (producing cotenant cannot evade his liability to account by making a physical
division of the product at the mouth of the well and offering to release to the nonproducing
cotenant his proportionate share).
104. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 90 Kan. 565, 135 P. 589 (1913).
105. See Bondurant, Royalty Owner Rights Under Division Orders, 25 TulOsA L.J. 571, 587
(1990). Compare Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968) with Tara
Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981). See generally Maxwell, Oil and Gas
Royalties - A Percentage of What?, 34 RocmY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 15-1 (1988).
106. See Sowell v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 604 F. Supp. 371, 375 (N.D. Tex.
1985), aff'd, 789 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1986).
107. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., No. J74-0307(W) (S.D. Miss. Apr.
24, 1989), affirmed hi p2rt and reversed in part, 905 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1990) (appellate court
affirmed trial court for all sales made during 1972-78, but remanded for reconsideration of
evidence as to deregulated gas sold post 1978).
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implied duties of lessees to lessors and an attempt by the court to divine
the intention of the parties to a voluntary lease contract. 10 The obligation
of a cotenant to account arises as a matter of law, not because of some
voluntary agreement. It would seem logical that an accounting among
cotenants should be on the basis of a fair market value at the time of
production. However, many of the cases that require an accounting based
on such market value imply that the actual sale proceeds of the oil and gas
establish that market value. °9 One authoritative commentator apparently
believes that the actual proceeds received constitute the basis upon which a
cotenant must account."l0
b) Establishing Market Value
Market value is generally understood to be the price at which a willing
seller will agree to sell to a receptive buyer when neither party is under any
compulsion to make the transaction and the parties are unrelated."' Thus,
the price at which parties contract with one another at arm's length to buy
and sell gas is an indicator of market value."2 Also, the prices at which the
producing cotenants were able to actually sell the gas that was sold would
certainly be an element of the market value," 3 though not necessarily
determinative."
4
Pursuant to the partial deregulation of the gas market, many publications
are now reporting "spot market" prices of various gas purchasers at various
locations, which is beginning to establish an objective market value for non-
contract gas. Thus, the market value of gas is becoming more readily
ascertainable than in times past.
In some jurisdictions, the price at which the producing cotenants were
able to sell their gas would in all probability establish the market value of
that gas." 5 There is a certain element of fairness in utilizing the actual
108. See, e.g., Hillard v. Stephens, 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581, 585 (1982).
109. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 90 Kan. 565, 135 P. 589 (1913); Miller
v. Wenexco, Inc., 743 P.2d 152, 156 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987); Martin, supra note 2, at 13-11
("This [duty to account] has generally been for the market value of the production, which has
also generally been the price received by the producing party.").
110. Kuntz, supra note 2, at 13-14.
111. See BLACK's LAW DicnoNAY 716 (4th ed. 1968) (definition of "fair market value").
112. Memphis Stone & Gravel Co. v. Archer, 102 So. 390, 390 (Miss. 1925) ("The usual
ordinary way to ascertain the market value is to show what articles were bought and sold for in
the market in accordance with contract.").
113. See Borrego, supra note 2, at 4-18 n.21.
114. Judge Wisdom notes that what constitutes "market value" is a question of fact to be
determined by the fact finder, be it judge or jury. See Piney Woods Country Life School v.
Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 238 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985). This point
was emphatically affirmed by the Fifth Circuit's most recent pronouncement in the long running
Piney Woods case wherein the Court of Appeals refused to overturn the trial judge's determination
that the long-term contract price was the best indicator of current market value for royalty
payments. See supra note 107.
115. See, e.g., Tara Petroleum v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1273 (Okla. 1981); Hillard v.
Stephens, 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581, 585 (1982). The Oklahoma and Arkansas courts found
that a requirement that the producer pay royalty on a price higher than the price received by
the producer would be unfair. The long-term gas contract price is deemed to establish the market
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proceeds received by the producing cotenants, assuming an arm's length
transaction. Forcing an accounting at a price greater than the producing
cotenant receives would appear to involve a punitive measure to some extent.
This might be warranted if the producing cotenant's refusal to recognize
the interest of his cotenant was done in bad faith." 6 In addition, even if
there were no question of bad faith, if the operator as producing cotenant
was selling gas at a below market price, the nonproducing cotenant whose
interest was not recognized would have a strong argument that any account-
ing should be on the higher prevailing market value, since the operator had
precluded him from marketing his share of the well's production at this
price.'1
7
Many of the cotenancy cases speak of the duty to account for "net
profits.""18 This measure of accounting, if the language is construed literally,
can only be established by utilizing the actual proceeds received from the
sale of the product." 9 Those producers who were fortunate enough to have
high priced long-te:rm contracts have resisted any accounting based on actual
proceeds received since they do not want to "share their market." They
prefer an accounting based on a lower market value price, or the price they
contend the non-producing party would have received had they sold their
gas.
It does not appear that there is any case which analyzes the precise
question of whether a cotenancy accounting should be based on actual
proceeds or a hypothetical fair market value where the interest of the
nonproducing cotenant was not previously recognized. Both measures can
be supported. The question may very well be answered on a case-by-case
basis depending on the equities of each situation. 20
5. Liability jbr Interest and Attorneys' Fees
In addition to the value of the gas sold, courts have held the producing
cotenant liable for other items of damage in accountings. Courts in Okla-
value of the gas sold in these market value royalty cases. But see State ex rel. Superior Oil Co.
v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 242 La. 315, 136 So. 2d 55 (1961).
116. Kuntz makes a distinction between (1) liability for damages which flow from a cotenant's
wrongful conduct such as excluding a cotenant, and (2) liability of a cotenant to account for
substances extracted by lawful operations. E. Kumz, supra note 23, § 5.6. Some courts have
held that where the exclusion of the cotenant is done in bad faith, the producing cotenant is not
entitled to recover his costs. Id.
117. See Memphis Stone & Gravel Co. v. Archer, 137 Miss. 558, 102 So. 390, 391 (1925).
118. E.g., Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924); Miller v. Wenexco,
Inc., 743 P.2d 152 (OkIa. 1987).
119. See Kuntz, supra note 2, at 13-14. But see Memphis Stone, 102 So. at 391 (defendants
alleged no duty to account since mining had not been profitable; court found excluded cotenant
was not confined to share of alleged profits as damages, but was entitled to market value of
mined product less charge for use of defendants' mining equipment).
120. The gas balancing cases that have required a balancing in money have done so as a
discretionary equitable remedy in an attempt to satisfy the court's perception of fairness. Kuntz,
supra note 2, at 13-24, -25.
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homa and Texas have held that the producing cotenant must account to
the nonproducing cotenant for interest at the legal rate on the net proceeds
from production, from the date the proceeds should have been paid after
recoupment of its costs. 21 There is an impressive line of authority that
interest should be allowed on equitable principles to compensate one for
another's use and possession of his funds."" These cases rightfully recognize
the time value of money, which should be an element of any accounting
among cotenants. Attorneys' fees are generally not recoverable in account-
ings, unless specifically authorized by statute or unless proof of bad faith
on the part of the producing cotenant in failing to account can be shown.1'
However, there is limited authority in the field of insurance law that courts
can award attorneys' fees and litigation expenses even in the absence of bad
faith where there exist substantially unequal positions between the parties
to the litigation and a failure to award attorneys' fees would result in
injustice.124 The denial of a cotenant's claim and a refusal to account can
be analogous to the denial of a claim under an insurance contract. However,
this author has found no case in which attorneys' fees were awarded in a
cotenancy accounting in the absence of proof of bad faith or statutory
authorization.
6. Costs Allowed to Producing Cotenant
Like the other elements of an accounting between cotenants, the costs
that the producing cotenant is allowed credit for in his accounting have not
been extensively discussed. The cases generally pronounce that the producing
cotenant may recover his costs of drilling, developing and producing the oil
and gas before accounting to the nonproducing cotenant and leave it at
that. However, there have been some cases that discuss the recoupment of
specific items of costs incurred by a producing cotenant.
At least one case has held that "overhead" expenses, such as salaries of
employees not directly employed on the property, are deductible.12 Income
121. Dilworth v. Fortier, 405 P.2d 38, 50 (Okla. 1965); MCZ, Inc. v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 672,
677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). Accord Campbell v. Homer Ore Co., 309 Mich. 693, 16 N.W.2d 125
(1944); Van Zandt v. Van Zandt, 227 Miss. 528, 86 So. 2d 466 (1956); McGowan v. Bailey, 179
Pa. 470, 481, 36 A. 325, 327 (1897).
122. See Bondurant, supra note 105, at 595-96 nn.116-18; C. McCoBmICK, HANDBOOK ON Tm
LAW OF DAMAGEs §§ 54-55 (1935).
123. See, e.g., Grisham v. Hinton, 490 So. 2d 1201, 1205-08 (Miss. 1986) (discussion of cases
in which award of attorneys' fees is proper). See generally Comment, The Award of Attorney's
Fees to Prevailing Defendants Under the Washington Long Arm Statute, 63 WASH. L. Rv. 125,
127 (1988). Texas appears to have a statute broad enough to authorize attorneys' fees in an oil
and gas accounting. See Tax. NAT. Rca. CODE ANN. § 91.401-06 (Vernon Supp. 1990). Suits for
accounting are frequently joined with partition suits for which many states authorize an award
of attorneys' fees.
124. See Grisham, 490 So. 2d at 1209 (Robertson, J., concurring); Blue Cross & Blue Shield
v. Maas, 516 So. 2d 495, 498 (Miss. 1988) (dicta) (Robertson, J., concurring) (bad faith insurance
case). See also Herring, The Availability of Extracontractual Damages for Emotional Distress
and Attorneys' Fee in Bad Faith Breach of Insurance Contract Cases, 59 Miss. L.J. 537, 545-49
(1989) (discussion of the Mississippi Supreme Court's apparently evolving position on awarding
attorneys' fees as articulated primarily through the opinions of Justice James Robertson).
125. New Domain Oil & Gas Co. v. McKinney, 188 Ky. 183, 221 S.W. 245, 250 (1920).
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taxes are generally not allowed as a cost of production, though production
taxes would be deductible. 26 The Texas Supreme Court has determined that
interest on the money expended by the producing cotenant is not an item
of cost for which the producing cotenant is entitled to take credit .
2 7
Oklahoma has held that the cost of drilling an unprofitable well in an
effort to develop the commonly owned property may be considered as a
cost of developing the property and charged against subsequent wells that
are productive.' u However, whether the costs that may be deducted are
limited to the actual costs incurred in connection with the drilling and
producing of the successful well, or whether all previous costs of developing
the property may also be included, is still an open question and one over
which there exists considerable debate. 2
9
Following the general acceptance of the Model Form Joint Operating
Agreements with accounting procedures attached, there has been little recent
litigation over the costs for which the producing cotenant may take credit.
The charges authorized by the joint operating agreement, which the nono-
perating producing cotenants have paid without protest, would probably be
considered the reasonable and necessary expenses of drilling and producing
for which the producing cotenant is entitled credit in any accounting.
7. Timing - When Does the Duty Arise?
Like the other components of cotenancy accounting, the time that the
accounting is due 's rarely discussed in the case law. Many different time
periods could be utilized. One distinguished commentator has suggested that
any accounting by cotenants is probably due on a monthly basis. 30 Others
have indicated less specific time periods, such as currently'3' or in reasonable
periods.3 2 Gas Balancing Agreements frequently postpone any cash account-
ing until reservoir depletion. There is probably little law on this issue since
the producing cotenant frequently refuses to account until ordered to do so
by the court.
Since the operator generally accounts to the producing cotenants on a
monthly basis, there is no real reason to require a different period for
accounting to the nonproducing cotenant. The courts would probably find
it reasonable for the operator or other producing cotenant to account to
the nonproducing cotenant at the same time it accounts to itself or the
other producing cotenants.
126. See Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 552, 69 S.W.2d 1037, 1045 (1934).
127. Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1965); accord Eagle Gas Co. v. Doran & Associates,
Inc., 387 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 1989); cf. Pursue Energy Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd. of Miss.,
524 So. 2d 569 (Miss. 1588).
128. Moody v. Wagner, 167 Okla. 99, 23 P.2d 633 (1933). But see Neeley v. Intercity
Management Corp., 732 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (producing cotenants not entitled to
recover for speculative efforts that proved unsuccessful).
129. See Hurtt & Jordan, supra note 62, at 16-10.
130. Smith, supra note 2, at 383.
131. Penn, supra note 2, at 18-14 (cash balancing on a "current" basis is required by the
rules of cotenancy).
132. Barnum v. Landon, 25 Conn. 137 (1856).
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8. Summary of the Duty to Account
Though it is in no one place clearly articulated, it appears that the
producing cotenant should account to the nonproducing cotenant for the
fair market value of the gas sold at the time it was produced, along with
interest on these sums from and after recoupment of the producing coten-
ant's reasonable and necessary costs. Also, the prices that the producing
cotenant receives should be considered in establishing this market value.
This accounting is due at the same time that the producing cotenant accounts
to itself or other producing cotenants.
C. Effect of Unit Operations
What is the effect on this duty to account when commonly owned property
is pooled, either voluntarily or by force of law, with separately owned tracts
to establish a producing oil or gas unit? If the well is located on the
commonly owned property, clearly the laws of cotenancy apply, and the
producing cotenant must account. 133 But what if the well is located on other
separately owned property in the unit? Is there still a duty to account?
1. Voluntary Pooling
There is no case on point involving the interest of a previously unrecog-
nized owner in a voluntarily pooled unit. However, courts have considered
the issue of whether a nonconsenting cotenant is entitled to participate in
unit production from a well in a voluntarily pooled unit located on land in
which the nonconsenting cotenant owns no interest. This issue was first
addressed in Boggess v. Milam, 3 4 in which the West Virginia Supreme Court
concluded that a cotenant in one tract who had been offered an opportunity
to join in a unitization agreement and declined was not entitled to share in
unit production from an adjacent tract that had been combined with his
land. 31 Since the cotenant had not contractually agreed to share in produc-
tion from the combined tract, he was precluded by the rule of capture from
participating in the production flowing from the off-lease well. Other courts
have followed the Boggess holding in similar factual situations. 36 However,
in all of these cases, the courts were faced with situations in which the
cotenant had been presented the opportunity to join in the pooling or
unitization agreement and had refused to do so. The Boggess court empha-
sized the importance of this point, stating:
All we mean to hold is that a tenant in common, particularly
one holding a minor interest in the oil and gas, is not to be
allowed, by withholding his consent to the development of the
133. See B. KAmR & P. MARmN, THE LAW OF POouNG AND UNTrzATIoN 19-95 to -97 (1989)
[hereinafter KRAmm & MAniN].
134. 127 W. Va. 654, 34 S.E.2d 267 (1945).
135. Id., 34 S.E.2d at 270-71.
136. E.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Roberts, 398 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1966); Hunt Oil Co. v. Moore,
656 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); California Co. v. Britt, 154 So. 2d 144 (Miss. 1963);
Scott v. Hunt Oil Co., 152 So. 2d 599 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
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boundary in which his interest lies, to prevent the development
of an adjoining tract under a unitization agreement to which he
has been given an equal opportunity to become a party and in
which his cotenants have all joined.
3 7
When the cotenant's interest has not been previously recognized, the
cotenant could not have been given the opportunity to join in the voluntary
pooling of the cotenant's interest, and Boggess and its progeny are therefore,
distinguishable. Thus, once a tenant's interest is recognized, the tenant
should be given the opportunity to ratify the pooling agreement and be
entitled to a share of the pooled production at least from the date of
ratification."3
2. Compulsory Pooling and Unitization
The effect of compulsory pooling and other conservation laws such as
well spacing and prorationing will, in a large part, depend on the language
of the statutes and the statutory scheme of the state's conservation laws.
While courts have held that a cotenancy per se is not created by the
formation of drilling units under state conservation laws, 3 9 other courts
have held that all rights of mineral and royalty owners are pooled by the
formation of the spacing unit.14 The various theories of the legal effect of
both compulsory and voluntary pooling on property rights, such as "cross-
conveyancing" or contractual arrangements, are beyond the scope of this
article. Suffice it to say, there appears to be a consensus that units that are
formed under the authority of state conservation laws create a cotenancy
in the production from the unit.'14 State conservation laws modify the rule
of capture, 42 and thus all of the true owners of the minerals in the unit
are entitled to participate in unit production, not just the party that actually
produces the minerals.
137. Boggess, 34 S.E.2d at 270-71. It should also be kept in mind that West Virginia follows
the minority rule that says that a cotenant cannot produce oil and gas from the common property
without the consent of all cotenants. Thus, Boggess can be viewed as not extending the harsh
minority rule any further than necessary.
138. KRAMm & MaRnN, supra note 133, at 19-94 n.228.
139. See, e.g., Tenneco Oil Co. v. District Court, 465 P.2d 468 (Okla. 1970).
140. Superior Oil Co. v. Beery, 216 Miss. 664, 63 So. 2d 115, 129-30 (1953).
141. Mills v. Damson Oil Corp., 931 F.2d 346, 349 (5th Cir. 1991); Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Thompson, 516 So. 2d :176, 387 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Anderson v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 782
P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1989); Beery, 63 So. 2d at 129-30; Ragsdale v. Superior Oil Co., 40 111. 2d 68,
237 N.E.2d 492, 494 (1968); Penn, supra note 2, at 18-6; Kuntz, supra note 2, at 13-11, -12.
But see Taylor, The Ecess Gas Market-Recent Legal Problems Precipitated by Excess Gas
Deliverability and Applicable Regulatory Provisions, 35 INst. ON Om & GAs L. & TAx'N 87, 116
(1984).
142. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co., 516 So. 2d at 385; Hassie Hunt Trust v. Proctor, 215 Miss.
84, 60 So. 2d 551, 556 (1952); Pierce, Reconciling State Oil and Gas Conservation Regulation
with the Natural Gas Act: New Statutory Revelations, 1989 B.Y.U. L. Ray. 9, 50 ("State
Conservation Laws are an attempt to define property in oil and gas and protect such rights from
the Rule of Capture piracy regime.").
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Most compulsory pooling laws, in effect, codify the common law of
cotenancy, establishing that all owners in the unit are entitled to possession
of the oil and gas produced and that the producing cotenants are entitled
to recoup their costs from unit production before a nonconsenting cotenant
is entitled to receive its share of production. Louisiana has one of the more
developed bodies of law with regard to ownership of production from units
formed by compulsion of state law. One of the earlier Louisiana decisions,
State ex rel. Superior Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., ' 4 established
that Superior, whose leases had been force pooled into the unit after the
well had been drilled and the operator had begun selling production under
its contract, was "entitled to be reimbursed for the value of its share of
gas" sold, though not at the selling party's contract price.' 44 Thus, the duty
to account for unit production was recognized, though the measure of the
accounting was not specified. The more recent case of Amoco Production
Co. v. Thompson'4" held that gas produced from a compulsory unit in
Louisiana is initially owned in "indivision," thus adopting the "molecular
theory" of ownership espoused by former State Conservation Commissioner
Pat Martin. Professor Martin announced his molecular theory of ownership
while serving as Louisiana's Commissioner of Conservation in an order
involving the application of Park Lane Enterprises, Inc. in Irene Field.
Commissioner Martin declared:
It follows ineluctably from the working of the order [a typical
pooling order] and the statute [La. R.S. 30:10 A(1)(b)] that when
gas is produced, it is owned by each of the owners in the unit
in the proportion provided for by the order. To put it another
way, each molecule of gas that is produced is owned by each
owner in the unit in a species of co-ownership. Neither the
operator nor any other owner of production may unilaterally
alter this effect of a unit order by deciding to sell "his" gas
while leaving another's gas in the ground. It is not enough to
say that a market was available to another owner or that the gas
would be made available to another owner if he could find a
market for "his" gas. The sole means of avoiding this effect is
through the order creating the unit or supplement thereto. 1"
Though Louisiana's concept of commission formed units is somewhat unique,
the Louisiana force pooling law which declares that production from any
part of the unit is deemed to be from each tract within the unit is similar
to many other states. 47 This type of force pooling statute creates by oper-
143. 242 La. 315, 136 So. 2d 55 (1961).
144. Id., 136 So. 2d at 57.
145. 516 So. 2d 376 (La. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 520 So. 2d 118 (La. 1988), on appeal
after remand, 566 So. 2d 138 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
146. Knmim & MARTrN, supra note 133, at 19-128.
147. Compare, e.g., Miss. CoDE ANN. § 53-3-7 (1972 & Supp. 1990) with Fla. Stat. § 377.28(7)
(1988) and Tax. NAT. REs. CoDE ANN. § 102.051 (Vernon 1989).
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ation of law a cotenancy in unit production. Thus, it would appear that oil
and gas production from compulsory units, regardless of where the well is
located, is generally treated as production from commonly owned property,
and the normal laws of cotenancy govern, though the rights of partition
may be affected depending upon the particular statute.
4
VI. Recent Legislation
The plight of the small working interest owner who is unable to market
gas in the recent declining gas market leads many small producers to seek
legislative relief. The first state to attempt a legislative remedy to the woes
of the small producer was Oklahoma. A 1983 Oklahoma statute 49 commonly
known as the "Sweetheart Gas Act" provides that all owners share ratably
from production of a gas well regardless of who is producing the gas,
declaring:
Whenever a well producing natural gas or casinghead gas is placed
into production, all owners within such well, including but not
limited to, all working interests, any interested parties having a
right to produce, overriding royalty, royalty and mineral interest
owners in the unit area under the well, shall be entitled to share
ratably in the revenues from the sale of production from the well
as set forth in the provisions of this act.'50
The bill further provides that the gas produced, irrespective of the owner
producing it, belongs to all of the owners of the well in proportion to their
well ownership.' The statute has withstood a constitutional challenge,
5 2
but it is not clear how widely it is being recognized in actual practice.'
Louisiana next dealt with this problem insofar as it involved unleased
owners by enacting legislation in 1984 that requires the unit operator to
account to an unleased mineral owner for the proceeds from the sale of
unit production. The statute mandates that the unit operator who proceeds
with the sale of unit production when an unleased owner has no arrangement
to market production must pay to such party the pro rata share of the sale
proceeds within 180 days.
5 4
148. Pat Martin oancludes that force pooling generally creates a kind of co-ownership or
cotenancy in the unit well's production that is analogous to cotenancy in land but not identical.
Martin, supra note 2, at 13-14.
149. 52 OKA. STAT. §j§ 541-547 (Supp. 1988).
150. Id. § 542(A).
151. Id. § 544.
152. Seal v. Corporation Comm'n, 725 P.2d 278 (Okla. 1986), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 479 U.S. 1073 (1987).
153. In a recent semirar on gas balancing sponsored by the Tulsa Law School and attended
by the author, the lecturer, Lewis Mosburg, asked for a show of hands from the audience which
consisted mainly of gas contract personnel of producers as to who was complying with the
mandate of the Oklahona Sweetheart Gas Act. No hands were raised.
154. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10A (West 1989) (act 345 of 1984).
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An act was recently enacted in Mississippi to require unit operators to
market gas on behalf of all owners in the unit except those who elect not
to so participate."' The law requires a unit operator to offer to market the
non-operator's gas and provides that the operator is entitled to charge and
recover expenses and costs associated with marketing such gas.
Many independents and owners of small working interests support gas
marketing legislation. The reason most frequently given is that the existing
remedy, i.e., the common law of cotenancy, is not specific or certain enough
to allow someone to plan and anticipate how one's interest will be treated
in the absence of a current gas contract. Thus, these legislative efforts seem
to be an attempt to give more certainty to the common law duty of cotenants
to account.
VII. Conclusion
A cotenant whose interest has previously been unrecognized by the pro-
ducing cotenant has been excluded from participating in what is rightfully
the unrecognized cotenant's. The producing cotenant is under a duty to
account to the previously unrecognized cotenant for the market value of
the gas at the time it is produced and sold, along with interest on these
amounts, after deducting the reasonable and necessary costs incurred in
producing the gas.
Your father's heirs must have your father's land.
Cotenants, just like heirs, are established by controlling law, and once
this relationship is established, the rights and duties of the cotenants auto-
matically flow to one another. The fact that a rightful owner's interest has
been previously unrecognized does not permit the dispossession of vested
rights. However, the parameters of these rights and duties are not as yet
clearly demarked. Through both legislation and judicial decisions, the
boundaries are beginning to be set.
155. Act of Mar. 30, 1991, ch. 490, 1991 Miss. Laws 546.
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